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Abstract:  In this paper I combine long multi-country time series data for interest rates and stock
returns with the institutional evidence for much earlier centuries amassed by economic historians
to study the question of  financial globalization and how it has altered since the late classical era.  
At their longest, for Dutch and English short-term interest rates, the quantitative data that I use
extend back slightly more than three centuries.   The institutional history provides information on
an additional millennium’s worth of experience.  The conclusion that I reach is that the
internationalization of money and finance and the globalization of financial markets are not new
phenomena.  They are part of an evolutionary process that began much earlier and that has
continued, albeit with periodic interruptions and reversals, for many centuries.  What we see
today is simply the latest and most advanced manifestation of this process.
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1. Introduction
The focus of this paper is on international financial integration historically.  It begins with a
review of one of the most fascinating episodes in international monetary history – the introduction by the
Emperor Constantine of a new coinage to check inflation that came to be used as an international money
and continued to play that role for seven centuries.  It goes on to consider the evolution of the foreign
exchange and credit markets in the Medieval era and the growth of these markets in the centuries that
followed.  It concludes with a presentation of statistical evidence on the degree of integration of stock,
bond and money markets over the past three centuries.
The implications of both this later quantitative analysis and the earlier historical analysis are
complementary.   From the end of the seventeenth century, we observe a strong tendency toward
international integration in money and bond markets and a similar, but somewhat weaker tendency in that
direction in equity markets.  This process, however, was both discontinuous and non-monotonic, having
been interrupted and in several instances reversed as wars and other dislocations intruded.
The evidence for earlier centuries, although much more fragmentary and much less precise,
points to much the same phenomena having taken place.  The difference observed between the two
periods as well as over time within the two periods centers around the range of financial assets and
number of markets involved and the geographical scope of that involvement.  Markets today are more
complete than earlier; integration is more geographically ubiquitous.
I summarize this evidence in the next two sections of the paper.  The first of these discusses the
earlier historical evidence; the second summarizes the results of the statistical analysis of the data for
interest rates and stock returns.  In the fourth and final section of the paper I discuss the substantive
conclusions that come out of this work.
2.  Historical Evidence
We are used to thinking of international financial integration in purely quantitative terms judging2  For additional discussion of the history of international monies see Dwyer and Lothian
(2002) and references cited therein.
2
it on the basis of the law of one price, by measures of  portfolio diversification and by the correlation or
lack thereof of various components of foreign and domestic income.  Since questions of what is big and
what is little are notoriously difficult to answer in economics, the all-or-nothing criteria of formal
statistical tests have much more often than not has been the basis for such judgements.
Quantitative evidence of this sort is certainly important but such evidence depends on the
availability of good numerical data.   There is, however, also a wealth of  evidence compiled by
economic historians extending back very much earlier.   This evidence comes from contemporary
accounts, business firms’ ledgers, notarial records, transcripts of court proceedings and other such
documents.  
In this section, I discuss the evidence relating to three important episodes: the introduction of the
bezant in the fourth century AD and its continued use as an international currency into the second
millennium A.D.; the development of a foreign exchange cum credit market – the two were inseparably
linked – and of banking in Medieval times; and the beginnings of  modern markets in tradable financial
instruments in the seventeenth century.
2.A.  International Monies
  Descriptions of banking transactions in Europe date from the ninth century (Lopez, 1979), and it
is clear from these descriptions and those of the immediately following centuries that these early banking
transactions had a strong international dimension.  The Medieval era, however, marked  neither the start
of international finance per se nor the first period in which the signs of financial globalization became
manifest.  For that we have to go back many centuries earlier to the reign of the Emperor Constantine.
2
In the three centuries that followed the demise of the Roman Republic, currency debasement and
inflation were a continual problem.  This debasement, however, ended abruptly in the fourth century3  See Einzig (1970) for a summary of monetary developments during the period of the
Roman Empire and Cipolla (1967) for an extensive treatment of the bezant and the other early
international monies. 
4  A particularly interesting discussion of this period, both from the standpoint of
economic thought and of intellectual history more generally is contained in Schumpeter’s (1954)
chapter on scholastic economic thought.   In this regard, see also Gilson ( 1991).
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A.D. when the Emperor Constantine introduced a full-bodied, stable gold coinage.
3  This coin, known
variously as the solidus, the bezant and the nomisma, was remarkable both for its stability and  its
longevity.  The bezant kept very nearly the same gold content until the middle of the eleventh century
and continued to be coined in Byzantium until the thirteenth.  It became a true international currency and
was used throughout the Mediterranean region.   It was, as one scholar subsequently put it, “the dollar of
the Middle Ages.”  Until the seventh century, when a very nearly identical coin, the dinar, was
introduced in the Moslem world, the bezant also had what amounted to a monopoly position.
At the very basic level of monetary transactions globalization clearly took place.  Interestingly, in
light of developments in Europe today, it was largely a spontaneous process – much more in the spirit of
Hayek than of Brussels.  Both coins were introduced by governments but such introduction in no way
insured their continued use over many centuries.  That depended on more than simply government fiat. 
2.B.  Banking in the Medieval World
Information on banking in Europe becomes tolerably good in the eleventh century and by the
next century improves further.  Genoese notarial  records exist starting in the year 1154 and from these
records historians have constructed a detailed schematic of banking in the late twelfth century and the
early part of the thirteenth (de Roover, 1974, Chapter 5).
The thirteenth century by all accounts was an extraordinary period.  It was a time of great
learning and of considerable intellectual interchange.
4  It saw the start of a commercial revolution in
which trade increased greatly, both within Europe and between Europe and the rest of  the world.   It was,
moreover, a period of financial innovation in which banking developed further and became truly
international and in which a gold coinage returned to Europe (Spufford, 1986).  Like the earlier bezant,5  See Pirenne (1936) and de Roover (1974, Chapter 5) for discussions of these fairs.          
                   
6  Further discussion of bills of exchange and the transactions they entailed can be found
in Neal (1990), in the various works of de Roover, such as de Roover (1974, 1963), and in
Spufford (1986).  
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these new coins achieved the status of world currencies.
International trade during the thirteenth century was centered around the regular fairs that were
held in various parts of Europe, most notably those of Champagne and Brie.
5  These fairs quite naturally
also became centers of foreign exchange activity.   The foreign exchange traders of the time, the money
changers, at first confined themselves to literal exchange transaction in which one type of coin was
exchanged for another.  Then as bills of exchange increasingly came into use, these money changers, as
also certain merchants, branched out to become intermediaries in this process.
A major purpose of these bills of exchanges was to eliminate the need for specie shipments each
time that goods were bought and sold internationally.  The bill of exchange was an order to pay at some
future date the foreign currency equivalent of a given sum of domestic money received today.  Because
of the time element involved it also, therefore, entailed credit extension, which was an additional and in
many instances primary motivation for its use.  The bill of exchange  evidently was a quite effective
device, since it remained an important vehicle for foreign exchange transactions throughout most of the
nineteenth century, and indeed survives today in modified form when coupled with a letter of credit.
6 
A typical trade-motivated transaction would work something like this.  Sarno, a Genoese
merchant, wants to buy cloth from LeBlanc at the fair in Provins.  To pay for this transaction and to
avoid having to ship specie, Sarno purchases a bill of exchange from Tullio, a local merchant banker,
paying in Genoese genoin.  Sarno then presents the bill as payment to Le Blanc who turns the cloth over
to him and remits the bill to Martino, a merchant banker operating in Provins.  Martino pays Le Blanc in
Tournois of Provins and  then goes on to settle with Tullio, his counterpart in Genoa.  This might be
simply a bookkeeping transaction, or it could involve an actual specie shipment, perhaps at some time in
the future chosen by the two as a date for reconciling their books.
An alternative motivation for the issuance of the bill is borrowing.  In the example above, Sarno5
would play the role of the lender and Tullio the role of the borrower.  The interest rate on the loan would
of course not be fixed since the exchange rate at which settlement eventually occurred would be the spot
rate at the settlement date and, hence, not decided in advance.  An analogous instrument today would be
a foreign-currency denominated floating rate note.  There are indications that in a world in which
ordinary borrowing and lending were regarded as usurious circuitous transactions of this sort were often
resorted to (Spufford, 1986).
In any event, whether used as a means of payment or to obtain credit, the widespread use of bills
of exchange meant that this early banking was by its very nature international in scope.  Making it even
more so was the way banking came to be organized in late Medieval times, with international branch
networks and correspondent relationships becoming the rule.   
The principal players in banking at that time were Northern Italian.   These Italian bankers were
active in the fairs and later established branch networks throughout much of Europe.  In the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries, Bologna, Florence, Genoa, Lucca, Milan, Palermo, Pisa, Sienna, Venice,
Barcelona, Valencia, Palma de Majorca, Bruges, Avignon, Montpelier, Paris and London  had become
centers of such activity.  Many of these cities had banking offices that were either actual branches of
major Northern Italian merchant banking firms banks or had correspondent relationships with them.  De
Roover (1974, Chapter 5) likens the typical arrangement at that time to modern bank holding companies. 
Records of financial transactions suggest that then as  now arbitrage was a standard banking activity,
with transfers of funds from one place to another dependent on the relative returns to those investments.  
These bankers also took deposits and engaged in transfers of funds among the accounts of customers of
their respective banks.
The reintroduction of a Western European gold coinage took place in 1252 with the striking of
two full-bodied gold coins in Northern Italy – the genoin of Genoa and then a few months later the
fiorina (or florin) of Florence (Lopez, 1956).  These came in response to the monetary muddle brought
about by debasement that was then engulfing Europe and the Mediterranean basin.  As with the earlier
bezant, an important additional stimulus was the need for a coin that could be used in international trade. 
For the next century and a half these two coins, the florin particularly, were the currencies of7  Spufford (1986) provides such data for a great number of currencies over the two and a
half centuries from 1252 to 1500.
8  This disparity between the two is also consistent with what is known about monetary
behavior over this period.  Sterling was relatively free from debasement until the time of Henry
VIII (1509-1547); the continental currencies, in contrast, were not.   See Chown (1992) and
Feaveryear (1963) for discussions of English experience prior to and during the reign of Henry
VIII.   
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international trade with smaller denomination silver coins and coins of various baser metals used in most
internal transactions.  In the fifteenth century, however, their place was taken by the ducato of Venice. 
During the thirteenth century, data for exchange rates start to become available.
7  Throughout
Europe smaller denomination silver coins and coins of various baser metals were used in most internal
transactions.  A good overview of exchange-rate behavior, therefore, can be had by examining the rates
of exchange between these coins and the gold coins used as the international money.  Table 1, Column 3 
presents such data, using the Florentine gold florin as the numeraire.  Shown in the table are per cent
changes of the exchange rates of six silver-based coinages relative to the florin for the period 1252 to
1500.   In each instance, the silver-based currency depreciated in value relative to the international
currency, the florin.  A major factor engendering these movements was the series of debasements that
took place in all of the European countries throughout this era.  As it happens, estimates of the extent of 
debasement of these six currencies have also been made (Cipolla, 1963).  These are shown in per cent
terms in the second column of the table.   These differ substantially, the pound sterling showing
relatively little movement, a drop in value of only 60 per cent over these two and a half centuries and the
Milanese soldi, in contrast, registering a decline of 220 per cent.
8   The correspondence between the
extent of the debasement of the various coinages and the exchange rate depreciation is exceedingly close
– a simple correlation coefficient  and a rank correlation coefficient of  .94 each.  The upshot is, that as
far back as Medieval times, there was an active market in foreign exchange, which, judging by these
comparisons, behaved very much as one would expect.
2.C.  The Development of Markets in Tradable Instruments9   See Rousseau and Sylla (2002 forthcoming) for an overview of Dutch and English
financial developments during this period 
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The Champagne fairs diminished greatly in importance during the early fourteenth century and
by the end of the fifteenth the private Italian banks had suffered similar fate, their ranks almost totally
depleted by failures.  Two sets of institutions gradually evolved to fill the void.  The first were the public
banks, governmentally affiliated banking institutions like the Bank of Amsterdam.  The second was the 
development during the course of the sixteenth century of the principle of negotiability.  The public
banks were among other things the engines by which discounting of commercial paper and similar
financial instruments came into use.  Acceptance of the principle of negotiability and the resultant
issuance of negotiable instruments were a sine qua non for development of the modern money market.
Another sixteenth-century change that gained  greater force in the two centuries that followed was a shift
in the geographical focus of financial activity from Southern Europe to the fringes of Northern Europe,
from Italy to the Low Countries initially, first to Antwerp, next to Bruges, and then to Amsterdam, and
finally to England and its center of financial activity, London.
9
At the end of the seventeenth century, the Dutch Republic was the world’s foremost commercial
empire and Amsterdam its most important financial center. The latter was a major center of financial
trading and Dutch investment activity, a large part of which was directed at England.  During these years,
Amsterdam and London had close financial links, with Amsterdam the senior partner (Eagly and Smith,
1976; Neal, 1990).  
The Dutch of this era were important financial innovators and international arbitrageurs. 
Perpetual bonds were a Dutch invention, futures contracts, margins, short sales and a number of other
financial-market instruments and techniques that today are regarded as modern were commonplace in the
Amsterdam of the seventeenth century (Homer and Sylla, 1976).
The Amsterdam Exchange, the center of Dutch financial trading activities,  became truly
international in its focus during this period.  In the early seventeenth century, trading centered almost
exclusively around Dutch East India Company shares, a small number of commodities and bills of
exchange.  By the start of the next century, that had changed.  The Amsterdam Exchange became a world10  See the accounts in Homer and Sylla (1996) and Dehing and t’Hart (1997). 
8
market in which a wide range of securities and commodities were traded.
10
England, in contrast, did not begin its development into a financial power until the end of the
seventeenth century. Here the chartering of the Bank of England in 1694 is regarded as the event that got
the ball rolling.  Then, in the century that followed English commercial banking began to develop
rapidly.  The number of London banks more than tripled between 1750 and 1800; the number of country
banks grew even faster, increasing by a factor of close to thirty over that half century, and then doubling
again between 1800 and 1810 (Ashton, 1955, pp. 179-183).  During this period, the London Stock
Exchange also was set up and an active market in foreign exchange begun (Michie, 1987).   The end
result of all this, and with a strong helping hand from the Napoleonic Wars and the French occupation of
the Netherlands, was London’s eclipse of Amsterdam as an international financial center.
A major contributing factor to both Dutch and English financial development was the
development of a financial press  in the two countries that regularly reported financial-market price
quotes.  The Dutch beurscourant was first on the scene in 1585.  By 1613 it was a weekly.  By the
eighteenth century a thrice-weekly publication the Amsterdamasche Courant was appearing. In it were 
listed market prices both of securities sold and real estate sold (Dehing and Marjolein ‘t Hart, 1997,
p.54). The best known and longest in operation in England was the twice-weekly Course of the Exchange
founded in 1697 by John Castaing, a London broker and Huguenot immigrant, and continuously
published for eighty years thereafter (Neal, 1990).   By the eighteenth century, moreover, there was a
regular communication system functioning between Amsterdam and London for exchanging financial
information (Dehing and ‘t Hart, 1997, p.58).    
3. Empirical Measures of Financial Integration
The principal measures of financial integration that I use in the empirical comparisons presented
below are real-interest-rate equalization and real-stock-return equalization.  As a check on the accuracy
of the first I use deviations from uncovered interest parity.
In an integrated economy, real rates of return on physical assets will tend to converge as also will11  See Frankel (1992) for a discussion of alternative criteria for assessing the degree of
financial integration and Furstenberg (1998) for a theoretical overview of the literature on the
subject.  See Bordo (2000), Goldberg, Lothian and Okunev (2001) and Goodwin and Grennes
(1993), Jackson and Lothian (1993), Johnson (1992) Lothian (2000) and Obstfeld and Taylor
(2002) for various empirical approaches to the questions of financial integration and real-interest
equalization.
12  For this equation to hold, rates of inflation and the rate of change of the exchange rate
have to be defined in terms of logarithmic derivatives; for discrete data it will only hold as a first
approximation.
13  See Lothian and Simaan (1998) for evidence on the performance of these two
relationships at various time horizons over the past several decades.
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real rates of return on financial assets.  Real rate equalization is, therefore, the broadest, and for that
reason most theoretically appealing of the various measures of financial integration.
11
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In equation (1) the ex ante real rate differential is, therefore, seen as made up of two components: 
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anticipated purchasing power parity in rate of change form.   Equality of ex ante real rates requires that
either of two conditions be satisfied, that either UIP and PPP both hold perfectly or that deviations from
the two conditions completely offset one another.  The implication of the first set of conditions is that the
law of one price holds perfectly over the time horizon in question in an ex ante sense in both bond
markets and goods markets.  In the long run, both do in fact appear to hold tolerably well.  In the short
run, however, both perform poorly.
13  The second would be true if deviations from UIP and PPP were due10
to a common cause.  Errors in agents’ forecasts of exchange rates is one that has been mentioned
prominently in the recent literature (e.g., Marston, 1994).  Under rational expectations, however, such
errors will be mean zero.  Over long periods, therefore, these errors are likely to be very much smaller
than over shorter periods.   Arguably, this accounts for the improved performance of UIP and PPP at
longer time horizons during the past three decades, a period in which such errors appear at times to have
been substantial.
The economic rationale for real interest equalization, however, can also be stated somewhat
differently.  In the standard Fisherian framework  (see in particular, Fisher, 1907, pp. 279-280), the real
rate of interest is the real rate of return on physical assets -- in Fisher’s terminology the “commodity rate
of interest.”  It and the real rate of interest on financial assets are linked via an arbitrage relationship. 
Using such a framework in place of equation (1), we can view the cross-country differential in real
returns on financial assets as being composed of quite different components than those on the right hand 
side of equation (1): the differential in real rates of return on physical assets and the (two) within-country
differentials between real interest returns on physical assets and on financial assets:
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where a  D 6t and D 6
F
t are the real returns on the physical assets in the two countries.  The first term on the
right-hand side reflects the degree of arbitrage across countries; the second, the degree of financial
intermediation within the two countries.  Friedman and Schwartz (1982, pp. 513-517), using such a
Fisherian framework in their analysis of the UK and US, relate the  nominal interest rate differential on
bonds to the two factors identified above and to the differential in the two countries’ inflation rates.
Writing their equation in terms of anticipated rather than actual rates of inflation, we get:
Rt. - R
F
t = (D 6t - D 6
F
t) + ([Dt - D 6t ]- [D
F








which is simply a transformation of (2). If PPP holds in rate of change form then the last term can be
replaced by the percentage change in the exchange rate and (3) can be rewritten as:140.  See Lastrapes (1998) for multi-country evidence on this subject as well as references
to other studies on the subject.   
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Here the deviation from UIP is the dependent variable.  
In the empirical work that follows, I use the current rate of inflation as a proxy for the anticipated
rate.  In large samples, given rational expectations, errors associated with this measure will tend toward
zero.   I, therefore, place more confidence in inferences with regard to the long-run behavior of real
interest differentials than their short-term movements.
Another reason to emphasize long-run behavior is the possible effect of transitory shocks on
interest differentials.
14  If, as is likely, there are differences in the magnitudes and timing of such shocks
among countries, their effects are likely to spill over into real interest differentials as well as into the
levels of rates within the various countries.  A monetary tightening in Europe, for example, that went
unmatched by similar policy changes in the United States would lead to short-term increases in European 
real interest rates and increases in European versus U.S. real interest differentials.  Real shocks also
might be expected to have short-term if not more long-lasting real-rate effects.
3.B. Data
In the empirical comparisons presented below, I use four bodies of data .
15  The first is for the
long period from 1690 to 2000 and is for Dutch and English short- and long-term interest rates.  The
particular focus here is on the first hundred years of the sample period.  Since the Dutch interest-rate data 
for this subperiod were only available in the form of decadal averages, I took similar averages of the
English interest rates.   The second body of data consists of annual series for short-term and long-term
interest rates, price levels and exchange rates  for eight and eleven countries, respectively.   These series
are of varying length depending upon the country but at their longest, they cover the period from 1800 to
2000.  The  eleven-country sample is made up of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the12
Netherlands, Norway Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the eight-
country sample excludes Canada, Italy and Norway.  The third body of data consists of stock-price
indexes for eight countries.  These also vary in length by country.  At their longest they also cover the
full two centuries from 1800 to 2000.  This eight-country sample consists of  Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Japan, Sweden,  the United Kingdom, and the United States.   The final body of data is for
short-term interest rates and consumer price indexes as reported by the IMF for 89 countries over periods
of various length during the course of  the past five decades.
I estimated the real interest rates as spreads between the corresponding nominal interest rates and 
contemporaneous rate of inflation.  I estimated real stock returns as the difference between the
percentage change in the stock price index and the  contemporaneous rate of inflation.  The price-level
data used to construct these estimates are for GNP (or GDP) deflators beginning in 1870 and linked to
WPIs or CPIs, depending on data availability, before then.  To reduce the measurement errors associated
with such, I work almost exclusively with quinquennially averaged data.   None of the results reported
below depends crucially on averaging, however.
3.C.  Three Centuries of Dutch and English Real Interest Rates
Figures 1a and 1b and Table 2 summarize the data used in comparing Dutch and English real
interest   rates.  Plotted in Figure 1a are decadal averages of the short-term and long-term real rates,
respectively.   Table 2 lists cross-country standard deviations of the two real rates by important
subperiods.  In all of these comparisons, data for the Napoleonic War period are missing.
The reasons for singling out these two countries are the early development of markets in tradable
instruments in both countries and the close links that the historical evidence suggests existed  between
the two from the sixteenth century on.  For the most part, the existence of such links is born out by the
data.   When viewed on a long-term average basis , real short-term rates track one another amazingly well
both over the entire sample period and the century from 1690 to 1879.   This is confirmed further in the
low and not greatly varying standard deviations listed in Table 2.  For long-term real rates the
relationship,  however, generally appears weaker, particularly over the 1690-1789 period.
To get at least a  rough idea of what might be expected to be the case in a well-integrated market. 13
I computed similar standard deviations for a U.S. treasury bill versus commercial paper and U.S. treasury
bills versus Eurodollar rates for sample periods from the 1950s and 1960s  through 2000.  These are
shown in Table 3.  They were 51 and 91 basis points respectively.   The corresponding ranges were 41 to
129 basis points and 37 to 125 basis points.  Most of the figures in Table 2 are not out of these ranges. 
The averages of these figures, in fact, are 100 basis points and 107 basis points for short-term and long-
term rates, respectively.  
3.D.  Real-Interest-Rate Convergence in the Broader Historical Sample
Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of real interest rate behavior in the  two
geographically broader historical samples.    Shown in Figures 3a and 3b are plots of  cross-country
average real short- and long-term interest rates and one standard deviation bounds about those averages.  
Shown in Figures 2b and 3b are plots of the cross-country standard deviations for varying groups of
countries chosen according to data availability. Tables 4 and 5 list averages of cross-country standard
deviations by subperiod.
Several features of these data deserve comment.  The first is the commonality of movements of
the various real rate series.  It is clear from the means and standard deviation bounds plotted in Figures
2a and 3a that in both instances a majority of the rates moved together.  That correspondence in
movements is not, however, constant through time, as we can see from the varying widths of the bands
and even more clearly from the cross-country standard deviations plotted in Figures 2b and 3b and the 
subperiod averages of those figures shown in Tables 4 and 5.  
That gets us to the second point of interest –  the time pattern of variations in these standard
deviations and hence the degree to which interest rate divergences have altered over time.  In both
instances such variations have been substantial.  In this regard, the much greater temporal homogeneity
of Dutch and English experience is unrepresentative.
For both real interest rates, divergences decrease during the course of the nineteenth century and
up until World War.  This pattern, moreover, begins earlier and is more pronounced for the smaller
groups of countries than for the larger groups.  The extent to which markets are integrated quite evidently
has varied not just over time but across countries at given points of time –  more countries becoming14
more integrated as time has elapsed.   This process, however, has certainly not been monotonic.  This is
evident both in the charts and the tables that were  reviewed above.  After reaching a low point during the
period of the classical gold standard (1875-1914), the degree of  interest rate divergence rises
dramatically during World War I.  For most of the country groups, it falls off somewhat,  but remains
high, during the Interwar Years, and then rises again during World War II.   Post-World War II there are 
returns to levels in the same general range as those observed under the gold standard, and in some
instances lower.
A final point to be made has to do with the choppy nature of both sets of series over the past
three to four decades.  Some of this doubtless is noise, but it also is possible without stretching the case,
to identify certain episodes.  This is the case both in the mid-1970s and then again in the early 1990's. 
Divergences in short-term real interest rates increase noticeably in the charts in both instances.   The first
episode very likely is associated with the move to floating exchange rates and the volatility in monetary
policy, the economy and real and nominal exchange rates that surrounded that move.   The second, I
suspect, is related to the union of the East and West Germany, the real-interest-rate effects that resulted
and the tighter German monetary policy that was pursued in its wake.
3.E.  Cointegration and Real-Interest Convergence 
Table 6 presents more formal econometric evidence on long-run behavior. The particular
question it addresses  is the nature of the long-term relations linking the various real interest rates,
whether given pairs of real interest rates share common trends and are therefore cointegrated and
convergent.
To see what these tests entail consider the cointegrating regression:
      rt  = a + b r t* + ut  (5)
where rt and rt* are the domestic and the foreign real interest rates, a and b are the cointegrating 
coefficients and ut is the error term.  Suppose the constraint b = 1 is imposed.  A test for cointegration of16  The alternative two-step procedure to test for cointegration would be to estimate (5)
using OLS and test if a first order autoregressive process of the residuals had a coefficient of 8 =
1.  A value of 8 significantly less than unity would provide evidence of stationarity and hence
real-rate convergence.  If b is known to equal unity, then the procedure used here results in a
more powerful test.  
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the two real interest rates then becomes a test for the stationarity of the differential between them:
16
rdt = : +  8 rdt-1 + 0t , (6)
where rdt / rt - rt*.
Table 6 contains the results of these regressions and the associated Dickey-Fuller tests of the
hypothesis that   8 = 1 for both short-term and long-term real interest rates.  In both sets of tests, the U.K.
rate served as the numeraire.  Also shown in the table for each regression is the ratio :/(1-  8 ), the
estimated long-run equilibrium differential between the respective real interest rates.
In all instances, it is possible to reject the unit root null of 8=1 at a high level of significance.   
The estimated values of 8 in these regressions, moreover, imply fairly rapid speeds of adjustment.  The
means of the estimated values of  8  are .25 and .23, for the short-term rates and  long-term rates
respectively, which translate into half lives of adjustment of roughly six months in both instances.  The
other major items of interest in these regressions are the estimates of the intercept term, :, and of the
long-tern equilibrium real-rate differential, :/(1-  8 ).  These estimates of  : are small in absolute value in
almost all instances and only insignificantly different from zero in two.  The associated estimates of 
:/(1-  8 ) are also quite small.  The median of the absolute values of :/(1-  8 ) for the short-term rates is
68 basis points and for the long-term rates is 36 basis points.  These are not only fairly small in their own
right but well below the estimates of the mean differentials reported in Table 3 for U.S. money-market
rates.  In an alternate set of regressions, I included a set of time-period dummy variables as additional
regressors.   The object in doing so was to see if there were shifts in means across regimes.  In general
this does not appear to be the case: Viewed as a group, the dummies were statistically insignificant in all
instances; viewed individually they were only significant in two cases.16
These results, therefore, strengthen the conclusions reached earlier with regard to financial
integration and real-interest equalization.  Real interest rates do in fact appear to converge, if not to
differentials of  zero, to differentials that in most instances are small in absolute value and not much
different from those observed in integrated U.S. markets.  The differentials in most instances also appear
temporally stable.
3.F.  UIP and Nominal Interest-Rate Convergence 
An alternative measure of integration that focuses on financial markets directly can be derived
from the UIP relation.  According to UIP:
$ s
*
t   =  Rt. - R
F
t , (5)
 the anticipated change in the exchange equals the nominal interest differential.  This in turn implies that
equality between the domestic nominal interest rate and exchange-rate adjusted foreign nominal interest
rate





which under fixed exchange rates translates into equality of the two nominal rates.  The advantage of this
measure relative to the  real-interest differential is that errors in expectations of inflation do not enter in. 
It is, therefore, well suited to comparisons in periods in which exchange rates are stable.  In periods of
floating exchange rates, errors in expectations with regard to the path of the  nominal exchange rate
obviously can play a role.  In this instance, what is taken in with one hand is, therefore, given back with
the other.
The evidence using the deviation from UIP as a measure of financial integration is summarized
in Figure 4 and Table 7.   Plotted in the chart are the spreads between French, Belgian, Dutch and U.S.
nominal short-term rates and the exchange-rate-adjusted short-term U.K. nominal rate.   I have omitted
the other three rates from the chart to keep it simple, but they tell roughly the same story.17  Additional work on the behavior of UIP historically is reported in Lothian and Wu
(2002).  See also Kugler and Weder (2002).
18   For further evidence on UIP performance in both the short and long runs see Chinn
and Meredith (2002), Kugler and Weder (2000), Lothian and Simaan (1998), and Lothian and
Wu (2002).
17
 Listed in the table are means and standard deviations of the exchange-rate-adjusted  spreads for
each of the subperiods individually and for all of them taken as a group.   The feature of the chart that
stands out  is the substantial difference in behavior between the long period in the nineteenth century in
which commodity monies were used, and hence in which fixed exchange rates prevailed, and the periods
of exchange rate volatility in the twentieth century associated with wars and the post-Bretton woods
float.   In the nineteenth century, these spreads in the main are relatively small and quite stable.   During
the two world wars of the twentieth century and in the inter-war period, behavior appears quite different. 
In all three of these episodes, wide and variable spreads were typical suggesting that the exchange-rate
changes were largely unanticipated.   Post-World War II, the exchange-rate-adjusted  spreads are
narrower but still quite variable.  The other feature of the chart that is of some interest is the difference
between U.S. and European interest rates in the early nineteenth century.
17  This could  simply be due to
a heightened risk of financial crises in the U.S. relative to Europe, or it could be caused by weaker links
between the U.S. and Europe than among European economies and markets.
Despite the often problematic behavior of UIP in the short run, it appears to have held tolerably
well over longer periods.
18  In this regard, the real-interest comparisons and UIP tell a similar story.  We
can see this in both the means for the full periods and the means for the subperiods in Table 7.   In both
instances, these are almost always small fractions of the corresponding yearly standard deviations.  The
one exception is the United States in the two nineteenth-century subperiods, but even here the means are
less than twice the associated standard deviation.  In no instance, therefore, can we reject the null
hypothesis of a zero mean using a conventional t test.  Viewed from the standpoint of economic
significance, the data tell a largely similar story.  In roughly half the cases, the subperiod means are less
than 100 basis points in absolute value.  The same thing is true for six of the seven full-period means.18
3.G.  Real Stock Returns
Since it is impossible to get dividend data for more than a few countries for long periods, I have
used the percentage change in real stock prices as a proxy for real stock returns.  Figures 5a and 5b and
Table 8 summarize the behavior of these data.
Real stock returns in many ways behave very similarly to real interests rates.  Returns are less
variable across the two smaller groups of countries than across the larger, the degree of divergence varies
over time, wars clearly increase such divergences, and the classical gold standard period and the past
several decades mark relative low points in the degree of divergence.  There are, however, two
differences that stand out.  The first is the much greater cross-country divergence of real stock returns
than of real interest rates, either short or long.   The second, and this is more puzzling, is the much less
noticeable effect of Interwar disruptions on stock returns as opposed to interest rates.   Divergences
generally are higher during those years than under the gold standard but not much different from in
recent years.
As a standard of comparison I again used U.S. data, computing cross-index standard deviations
of  returns from the S&P 500, the Dow Jones Industrial Average and  the NASDAQ index for the periods
1940-2000 and 1960-2000.  These figures, which are shown in Table 3, were both roughly 300 basis
points.  This is in the lower part of the range of  figures reported for cross-country stock-return
divergences in Table 8.  It is, however, substantially greater than the figures reported for U.S. interest
rates in Table 3.  This disparity is consistent with risk involved in holding equities being greater than the 
risk involved in holding bonds.  It is possible that risk premia also explain the much greater difference
between divergences in cross-country stock-returns and cross-country divergences in  real interest rates. 
These results raise an additional issue, however.  In all of the comparisons the possibility arises
that what has been captured is simply variations in real interest rates and real stock returns brought about
by variations of domestic variables that affect the real returns to physical assets within an autarchic
world.   There are three problems with that reasoning.  The first is that it does not square with what we
otherwise know about the economic history of the past two centuries.  The gold standard period by all
measures was a period of substantial economic and financial openness.   Financial markets, in particular,19  See O’Rourke (2002) for a concise historical overview of globalization. Lothian
(1997),  Lothian (2000), and Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) present a variety of different types of
evidence with regard to its financial dimensions.
19
were well developed and, it appears, rather closely linked.
19    The second is the behavior of
macroeconomic  variables over this period.  Purchasing power parity over the long-term held quite well
(see inter alia Lothian and Taylor, 1996).  Under fixed exchange rates, inflation rates were very similar
across countries; under floating rates exchange rate changes on average followed inflation differentials.  
The third stems from what international trade data tell us about the various periods. 
In Figure 6, I have reproduced a chart from Lothian (2000) that extends the work of Grassman
(1980).  Shown in the chart are ratios of imports plus exports to GNP for the original five countries from
Grassman’s sample plus four more of those studied in this paper and my earlier paper.  The time patterns
are clearly quite similar to those that we see un the charts for real interest rates and to a lesser extent also
real stock prices – substantial openness under the classical gold standard and recently and the reverse in
World War I, World War II and the Interwar Period.
3.H.  Real-Interest-Rate Behavior in Recent Decades 
Let me now turn to a related issue, the spread of integrated markets in recent decades and 
geography of globalization.  Casual observation suggests that even thought the strength of the links
among financial markets still is a good deal weaker in some parts of the world than in others it is
nevertheless much greater now than even two decades ago.
A very basic indicator of the extent of this change is data availability.  In economics it is standard
usage to refer to the data that are used in empirical investigation as “the sample.”  In the context of the
interest-rate comparisons presented above, the term is a complete misnomer.  Until the past few decades
the small group of countries studied there were virtually the only countries for which one could obtain
time series on interest rates.  In the rest, organized markets simply did not exist.  Today the situation is
dramatically different.   The interest rate data published by the International Monetary Fund that I use
below span 89 countries, and that is after elimination of a fair number of countries with missing
observations or only very short time series.   This stands in clear contrast to the groups of 8 and 1120
countries for which long-term time series data are available. 
Shown in the five panels of Figure 7 are plots of cross-country standard deviations of annual ex-
post short-term real interest rates for this group of 89 countries for various subperiods during the past 50
years chosen on the basis of data availability.   The first four panels plot the cross-country standard
deviations of these data for four subgroups individually: OECD members, Asia-Pacific, Africa, and Latin
America-Caribbean.  The last plots standard deviations taken across the means of these four subgroups. 
Two features of these charts stand out.  The first are the substantial cross-country divergences
observed within the three periphery country groups as well as across the four groups over the sample
period.  The second is the generally smaller cross-country divergence observed in four of five cases
during the 1990s as opposed to earlier.  The implications in each  instances are straightforward. 
Integration clearly has been and for the most part still is much less complete within the periphery than
within the core but, nevertheless, is increasing.  Indeed, for the periphery versus the core on average, it
appears not much different from the major countries examined above.
4.  Conclusions 
"Nothing under the sun is new, neither is any man able to say: Behold this is new: for it hath
already gone before in the ages that were before us."  In international finance, as in many other areas, 
Ecclesiates’ dicta contains much truth.  
A global financial marketplace is not something that has just recently appeared.  In one form or
another, it has been around for centuries, if not in fact for more than a millennium.  That is the principal
message that comes out of this paper.
From the fourth century and into the later Medieval period international finance meant
facilitating international trade – providing a means of payment that could be used in international trade.   
For five centuries or more this, in turn, translated into the establishment of a coinage that was stable and
not subject to debasement and that was otherwise reliable.   This early coinage, the bezant, was struck
initially during the reign of Constantine and coined continuously thereafter in Byzantium through the
eleventh century.
Shortly after that banking began to develop and the bill of exchange and its predecessor the20  See the review of this history in Kohn (2001).
21
instrumentum ad cambium were introduced, the principal stimulus again being international payment.  
Because settlement using such instruments was delayed, their issuance also entailed credit extension. 
This, along with deposit-taking and giro transfers, became a second major function of the early banking
firms.  Because much of the business of these firms was cross-border they established branch networks
like those of modern bank holding companies.  Not surprisingly, negotiable instruments and markets in
which they could be traded came next.
20
Data exist for such markets beginning in the late seventeenth century and those data tell very
much the same story as the earlier historical evidence.  Throughout the three hundred plus years for
which there are data for interest rates, and the two hundred years for which there are data for stock
returns, we see behavior similar to that observed in today’s global markets.   This is true of the eighteenth
century, much of the nineteenth century – the classical gold standard era particularly – and the early and
late twentieth century.  Wars and other disruptions, most notably the Great Depression of the 1930s and
the reactions thereto, interrupted and reversed the integration process, but then it began all over again.  
The prospect of gains from trade quite evidently exerts a powerful force.
The differences in international financial arrangements over the course of the long period
examined in this paper have been substantial, but these differences have been more differences in degree 
than in kind.   The number of markets and types of instruments issued and traded has grown enormously,
even during the course of the last three decades.  Information is now transmitted in seconds rather than in
days, weeks or months.  Many more parts of the globe have such markets than even a few decades ago.
The general thrust toward internationalization, however, is not new, nor are the basics of how
international markets operate.22
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 Table 1.  Exchange rate depreciation and











 Sources: Cippola (1963)and Spufford (1986).
       
Table 2.  Dutch and English real interest rates:
  Subperiod averages of cross-country 
deviations of decadally averaged data 
Period Short-term Period Long-term
1690-1789 1.38 1710 -1789 1.59
1810-1849 0.76 1810 -1849 1.15
1850-1869 0.70 1850 -1869 1.31
1870-1909 0.97 1870 -1909 0.99
1910-1919 1.20 1910 -1919 1.53
1920-1939 0.42 1920 -1939 0.94
1940-1949 1.39 1940 -1949 0.34
1950-1970 1.20 1950 -1970 1.06
1970-2000 0.98 1970 -2000 0.73
Sources: See appendix.33
Table 3.  Standard deviations of five -year averages of
U.S. stock returns and interest rates
                      Interest rates Stock returns
CP, t-bill Euro $, t-bill S&P500, DJIA, 
 NASDAQ
1940-2000 0.51 1957-2000 2.94
1960-2000 0.51 0.93 1963-2000 3.10
  Sources: See appendix.
Table 4. Short-term real interest rates: Subperiod averages of cross-country 
standard deviations of quinquennially averaged data
Period SD2 SD3 SD5 SD6 SD7 SD8
1800-1814 2.76 0.56
1815-1849 1.25 1.44 2.71 2.46
1850-1874 0.81 0.71 3.66 3.33 3.16
1875-1914 1.09 1.13 1.53 1.47 1.50
1915-1924 1.15 1.48 5.73 5.90 8.26
1925-1939 5.35 4.49 3.57 4.00 3.80 3.57
1940-1949 1.97 3.27 3.25 6.41 6.15 5.73
1950-1974 1.74 1.30 1.53 1.64 1.52 1.54
1976-2000 0.88 0.89 1.30 1.70 1.69 1.90
Sources: See appendix.
Notes:  The eight countries listed in order of their inclusion are the United Kingdom, France, the
Netherlands, the United States, Germany, Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland.
The symbols SD2 through SD8 indicate the number of countries (in the order indicated above)
used in computing the standard deviations.
  The years and countries for which data are missing are as follows: France, 1915-24 and 1939-48;
the Netherlands 1942-45; Belgium,1915-18 and 1941-47; Germany,  1920-24 and 1945-49.34
Table 5.  Long-term real interest rates: Subperiod averages of cross-country 
standard deviations of quinquennially averaged data
Period SD3 SD5 SD6 SD10 SD11
1800-1814 4.62
1815-1849 1.64 2.48 1.47
1850-1874 2.94 1.86 2.47 2.81
1875-1914 1.26 1.53 1.26 1.17
1915-1924 5.43 8.90 6.44 6.14 7.19
1925-1939 4.20 3.51 3.99 3.96 3.79
1940-1949 12.37 13.69 10.69 11.95 11.58
1950-1974 1.14 1.39 1.44 1.61 1.59
1976-2000 0.91 2.09 1.22 1.34 1.55
Sources: See appendix.
Notes:   The eleven countries listed in order of their inclusion are the United
Kingdom, France, the United States, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Canada, Italy,
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.35
Table 6.  Regression and test results for real interest differentials relative to U.K. 
  rdt = : +  8 rdt-1 + 0t 
nobs   :    8 DF R2/SEE   : /(1- 8)
Short-term rate
France 176 -0.162 0.082 12.572 0.007 -0.176
-0.321 1.119 6.687
Netherlands 170 -0.039 0.213 10.518 0.046 -0.049
-0.094 2.851 5.415
Germany 144 0.505 0.252 9.303 0.065 0.675
1.332 3.132 4.508
U.S. 153 1.267 0.386 8.214 0.150 2.062
2.379 5.154 6.252
Belgium 148 0.297 0.310 9.024 0.101 0.430
0.569 4.046 6.329
Sweden 133 1.168 0.136 9.991 0.018 1.351
2.965 1.567 4.304
Switzerland 68 -0.605 0.383 5.620 0.156 -0.980
-1.573 3.491 3.100
Long-term rate
U.S. 185 0.461 0.264 10.429 0.071 0.626
0.988 3.735 6.294
France 184 -0.095 0.206 11.022 0.043 -0.119
-0.175 2.860 7.306
Netherlands 170 0.309 0.158 10.954 0.025 0.367
0.714 2.062 5.615
Belgium 166 -0.234 0.328 9.121 0.108 -0.348
-0.435 4.449 6.901
Germany 163 0.693 0.309 9.622 0.103 1.002
1.685 4.301 5.180
Sweden 114 0.116 0.112 10.171 0.014 0.131
0.361 1.279 3.411
Canada 113 0.065 0.254 8.133 0.065 0.087
0.129 2.774 5.375
Italy 113 0.443 0.059 9.962 0.003 0.470
1.377 0.620 3.378
Norway 113 0.243 0.296 0.000 0.076 0.345
0.529 3.030 4.832
Switzerland 68 -0.713 0.304 5.526 0.081 -1.024
-1.729 2.413 3.322
Sources: See appendix..36
Table 7.  Deviations from UIP relative to U.K. 
France Netherlands Belgium U.S.  Germany Sweden Switzerland
1800-1815 -0.934
(12.221)
1816-1860 0.105 -0.575 0.769 5.270 1.424 1.058
(1.860) (2.227) (1.901) (3.132) (5.447) (2.668)
1865-1913 -0.350 -0.048 -0.461 2.428 0.285 1.600 0.332
(1.300) (1.071 (`2.762) (1.455) (1.276) (1.508) (0.420)
1926-1939 -2.224 3.166 14.598 1.531 -4.853 1.690 2.404
(17.219) (11.927) (44.961) (16.788) (33.263 (4.964) (14.483)
1950-1972 -0.211 1.074 2.188 -0.178 3.146 1.803 -0.619
(7.992) (4.971) (4.267) (4.567) (5.856) (4.167) (5.243)
1973-1999 -0.638 -0.928 0.117 -0.424 -1.001 -1.375 -1.915
(10.568) (11.277) (11.426) (13.284) (11.759) (10.992) (12.796)
1973-1989 -0.024 0.089 1.480 -0.888 -0.043 -1.352 -0.597
(10.763) (11.449) (11.454) (15.963) (12.397) (12.490) (12.912)
1990-1999 -1.682 -2.659 -2.200 0.365 -2.631 -1.413 -4.156
(10.714) (11.361) (11.597) (7.462) (11.027) (8.469) (12.952)
Combined -0.463 0.090 0.613 1.780 0.214 0.842 -0.354
7.841 6.129 6.988 8.004 11.770 5.839 9.929
Sources: See appendix.
Notes:   Standard deviations are in parentheses under the respective means.  The combined mean is the
mean of the observations within the first six subperiods; the combined standard deviation is computed as
the square root of the sum of the sums of squares for the six subperiods divided by the relevant degrees
of freedom.  37
Table 8.   Real stock returns: Subperiod averages of cross-country 
standard deviations of quinquennially averaged data




1875-1914 2.62 3.18 3.96
1915-1924 1.83 7.12 9.14 8.48 8.09 7.17
1925-1939 3.36 5.83 6.01 5.88 6.67 6.33
1940-1940 0.92 7.35 7.45 7.45 18.04 16.88
1950-1974 4.58 6.40 6.33 6.60 7.12 7.02
1976-2000 3.04 4.86 5.36 5.34 6.25 6.17
Sources: See ap pendix.
Notes: The eight countries listed in order of their inclusion are the United Kingdom, the
United States, France, Germany, Japan, Denmark, Sweden and Canada.